Paying Auditors to audit pollution compliance inspections

An article in the Wall Street Journal (July 18, 2013) describes an experiment in Gujarat, India, to increase the correctness of the pollution readings by auditors. In the past, most pollution audits claimed compliance. But two experiments were conducted – the first one randomly checked audits but offered a higher rate for audits that were correct in their assessments of compliance. The second experiment paid a bonus if readings were accurate if checked randomly. The impact – both an increase in detection of polluters, as well as an increase in accuracy. Can ideas from this experiment be used to check garment manufacturers in Bangladesh ? Given that better readings also caused an increase in investments in pollution control equipment, does this suggest that improving audit correctness can improve global pollution levels ? How important is a sustained pollution control focus by local governments an ingredient for success of such approaches ?

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About aviyer2010

Professor
This entry was posted in Global Contexts, Service Operations, Sustainability and tagged , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

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